addition individual parents and students were subject to state compulsory attendance laws.

This was the awesome judicial power to which I referred in my 1977 article and which the Groundswell to-be-intervenors faced in September, 1980. That power has since been curtailed as to some judicial actions, such as busing children in the absence of de jure segregation, by the November 6, 1979 state constitutional amendment upheld in 1982 by Crawford III. But in school districts in California and elsewhere trial judges continue to exercise power over student assignments where they find remnants of long past de jure segregation to be “remedied.”

Additionally, Crawford I was continuously cited by the Carlin Plaintiffs as supporting continued assignments to particular seats and classrooms solely on the basis of race for the “sake of the District's integration plans.” In a memorandum dated July 12, 1996, Plaintiffs dismissed Groundswell's claim that the constitutional rights of the non-class children so assigned were violated, citing Crawford I, 17 Cal.3d 280, at 297, and stating:

In making this argument, Groundswell ignores the fact that this Court's jurisdiction arises under the California Constitution and not under federal law.... [Emphasis in brief]