Liberate Public Schools
from Government by Lawsuit  /  Phase Seven
  
100
Groundswell Motion to End Jurisdiction
Conditionally Granted, Effective July 1, 1998
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We pointed out that this motion was necessary in view of lack of evidence of any change in the posture of Board concerning receipt of state integration funds. We urged that the discharge of the writ was necessary to insure that all students entering school after its effective date would be able to exercise their civil rights on the same basis as their counterparts in Los Angeles and elsewhere where all court jurisdiction over public schools had been terminated.

We argued that abdication of jurisdiction by the Board beyond July 1, 1998 for the purpose of obtaining state integration funds was contrary to applicable court rulings, citing particularly the rulings of the trial court and then the Court of Appeal on February 9, 1998.

We concluded with a quote from Dowell, supra, 111 S.Ct. 630 at 637, that desegregation decrees “are not intended to operate in perpetuity. Local control over the education of children allows citizens to participate in decision making.” Again, we were joined by Senator Kopp and Assemblyman Baldwin as amici / interested persons.

On August 11, the Board, joined by Plaintiffs, opposed the motion, concluding:

If, however, the Court nevertheless does decide to “discharge the Writ” it is respectfully submitted that in so doing it should also be careful to ensure that the District's continuing obligation under the Final Order to ameliorate racial segregation remains clear.

In our closing brief on August 24, we recalled Missouri v. Jenkins 132 L.Ed.2d 63 (1995). The Supreme Court disapproved the effort by a similar combination of entities by way of a plaintiff-class and a school district (Kansas City, Missouri, School District) seeking continuation of court jurisdiction to secure state funds for their continuing pursuit of “desegregative attractiveness” of schools. Id. at 71-73.

On August 26, 1998 Bob and I gathered my travel accessories and he took me to the San Diego office of Jim Marinos, who arranged to trundle me to the County Courthouse at 9:00 A.M. for the last of many Carlin hearings which I started attending in 1979. The Court then granted our Motion to Discharge the Writ of Mandate in a manner which left the judicial directions as to the Board's integration plan intact, as is seen from Next
 


Carlin Carlin v. Board of Education, San Diego Unified School District,
San Diego Superior Court No. 303800 (1967-1998)
San Diego, California
 
Jenkins Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 115 S. Ct. 2033 (1995)
Kansas City, Missouri
 
Dowell Dowell v. Bd. of Educ. of Okl. City Public Schools, (10th Cir. 1989), 890 F.2d 1483
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
 
Dowell Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City P. Sch. v. Dowell, 111 S.Ct. 630,638 (1991)
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
 
Carlin Board of Education v. Superior Court, 61 Cal.App.4th 411 (Feb.1998)
[conclusion of Carlin v. Board of Education]
San Diego, California
  
  Liberate: Phase 7, pages 91 - 101 — Previous Next
  

Liberate Public Schools
from Government by Lawsuit

A Long Pro Bono Struggle
Against Racially Balancing Public School Students
in a Thirty-Year Lawsuit
by Elmer Enstrom, Jr.
  
Contents
A chronological presentation of the 30-year Carlin affirmative action lawsuit:
a legal battle to reassert the "separation of powers" concept
of a republican form of government embodied in our Constitution.
  
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