Third Motion to Terminate Jurisdiction

Following denial of my second motion to terminate jurisdiction, I felt those recent Supreme Court decisions were on my side if along with them I could present additional cause for termination. Another legal reason developed in proposed amendments to the Ralph W. Brown Act, Cal. Govt. Code, Secs. 54952.1, et seq., intended to “protect the right of the public to participate in local government.” I studied the proposals on October 9, 1993 at a continuing education lecture at the State Bar Convention and when they were enacted effective April 1, 1994, I was prepared.

On July, 22, 1994, upon receiving a waiver of filing fee, after showing the lengthy pro bono representation of non-class students among other factors, the Intervenors for a third time moved to terminate court jurisdiction. We again cited the Dowell (1991) and Freeman (1992) decisions as favoring termination of desegregation cases at the earliest practicable date; and that awaiting that time the non-class constituents of the Board were deprived of the governing participation to which they were lawfully entitled.

Intervenors emphasized that the Brown Act was designed to encourage constituents' participation. We gave the example that there had been no public input into the Board's immediate decision on April 7, 1992 in secret session under the Brown Act's litigation exception, to reverse its earlier decision and oppose the Intervenors' filing just a day earlier to terminate the case.

On September 21 and 27, 1994, the responses of the Board and Plaintiffs, respectively, were received in opposition to Intervenors' motion, both of which claimed that ending court supervision would cause a loss of state integration funding. To those claims we replied:

Nor does the overstated speculation that the closure of the case along the lines of the Los Angeles case “could cost the District as