Groundswell Dissenters Prepare for Trial

Concurrently, there was no lessening of the effort by the local ACLU counsel to impose busing in San Diego by the Carlin Plaintiffs, who had appealed the lack of a busing segment in the present order.

In the preparation of this representation, I had transformed my objections to forced busing in my 1977 commentary into the manner in which we would pose them in intervening and at trial in the Carlin proceedings. The pleadings, and then the evidence, would reflect that the opposition was founded upon a truism stated in 1620 when the colonists were first forming their first legislative assemblies:

Every man [and woman] will more willingly obey laws to which he [or she] hath yielded his [or her] consent.

We would show that persons facing judicially-legislated governmental affirmative action affecting them without going through the democratic process left them with no recourse but to assert their objections in the court proceeding in which it was being imposed.

My commentary, Busing — Opposed, and this Sequel reflect the extension of Brown v. Board of Education from discontinuing segregation in public schools, to Green, requiring affirmative “desegregation” in rural schools, and then to Swann applying such affirmative action in urban schools found to have committed de jure segregation.

Crawford I in 1976 extended such affirmative action to California schools regardless of the cause of what was termed de facto segregation. The Carlin class was seeking to apply that ruling to the Groundswell dissenters, whose objections should be considered relevant.

With that in mind, we prepared for the hearing on our intervention. A stipulation with the Carlin Plaintiffs and the Board established the