San Diegans Challenge Perpetual
Court Assignment of Pupils,
Emanating fromCarlin v. Board of Education,
To Restore Local Control
According to the Constitution

Groundswell objected to any further extension of jurisdiction, claiming “(f)or each day that the present "Final Order" remains in effect, non-class constituents ... will be unable to exercise their civil rights under (Section 31 (Proposition 209)) and independently applicable civil rights laws in a manner similar to their counterparts elsewhere not under the constraints of a court order.” 61 Cal.App.4th at 417.

The Appellate Court concluded:

In sum, although the (Superior) court acknowledged Section 31's (Proposition 209) adoption in ruling on Groundswell's motion, the court did not conclude the section compelled it to modify its previous order. Rather, the court reviewed the action in the context of new law to revisit its prior order. Having considered it, along with other factors, the court concluded the historical basis for the court's involvement no longer existed; District had demonstrated its commitment to desegregation; continued court supervision was no longer necessary to compel compliance with constitutional obligations; and control should be returned to District. Based on these findings, the court did not abuse its discretion in accelerating the end of supervision. Id. at 422.

This was a return to local control by gaining the right of “non-class” San Diego citizens to participate on an equal basis with those formerly in the preferred “class” as defined in the Carlin class action. But it left undisturbed the denial by Superior Court of the portion of Groundswell's motion to eliminate consideration of race in certain programs to bring the integration program into compliance with current federal decisional law.

That the Board and Plaintiffs sought to retain in the integration program the objected-to racial aspects was evidenced by their opposition to the discharge of the 1977 writ of mandate in the Carlin case. So Groundswell's next step necessarily was to obtain an order discharging the Writ of Mandate. This would make it possible to assert the unconstitutionality of those aspects of the challenged programs free of any inhibition alleged by reason of a pending court order.
 

Carlin v. Board of Education, San Diego Unified School District,
San Diego Superior Court No. 303800 (1967-1998)
San Diego, California
 

Board of Education v. Superior Court, 61 Cal.App.4th 411 (Feb.1998)
[conclusion of Carlin v. Board of Education]
San Diego, California
 

— Handbook: Challenge Five, pages 65 - 74 —