San Diego Intervenors
Challenge Court Assignment of Pupils
in Carlin v. Board of Education
Toward Restoring Local Control
of San Diego Public Schools

Following denial of the second motion to terminate jurisdiction, another legal reason developed. Amendments to the Ralph W. Brown Act, Cal. Govt. Code, Secs. 54952.1, et seq., intended to “protect the right of the public to participate in local government” were enacted effective April 1, 1994.

On July, 22, 1994, the Intervenors for a third time moved to terminate court jurisdiction. They again cited the Dowell (1991) and Freeman (1992) decisions requiring termination of desegregation cases at the earliest practicable date; and that awaiting that time the non-class constituents of the Board were deprived of the governing participation to which they were lawfully entitled.

Intervenors emphasized that the Brown Act was designed to encourage constituents' participation. They gave the example that there had been no public input into the Board's immediate decision on April 7, 1992 in secret session under the Brown Act's litigation exception, to reverse its earlier decision and oppose the Intervenors' filing just a day earlier to terminate the case.

On September 21 and 27, 1994, the responses of the Board and Plaintiffs, respectively, were received in opposition to Intervenors' motion, reiterating that ending court supervision would cause a loss of state integration funding. Intervenors replied this was not a legal basis for continued jurisdiction.

To the contentions that the present “Final Order” should remain in effect, Groundswell Intervenors reiterated their earlier objection to the order's provision sanctioning student assignments solely because of their race and its implementation.

In conclusion, Intervenors cited in support of their motions, as well as the Los Angeles 1981 final order, Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Ed., 611 F.2d 1239 (9th C.A., 1979) (trial court may not retain jurisdiction merely for matters of convenience); and Dowell (desegregation decrees are not intended to operate in perpetuity).

Intervenors also distinguished Freeman as pertaining to a school district under a desegregation order to establish a unitary system (whereas this district had always operated a unitary system); that when it had achieved a unitary status in the area of student assignments, court
 

Carlin v. Board of Education, San Diego Unified School District,
San Diego Superior Court No. 303800 (1967-1998)
San Diego, California
 

Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Ed., 611 F.2d 1239 (9th C.A., 1979)
Pasadena, California
 

Dowell 

Board of Ed. of Oklahoma City v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1990)
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
 

Freeman 

Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 112 S.Ct. 1430 (1992)
DeKalb County School System (DCSS),
DeKalb County, Georgia
 

— Handbook: Challenge Four, pages 55 - 63 —