San Diego Parents Challenge
Busing of Their Children,
in Carlin v. Board of Education,
as Real Parties In Interest,
Entitled to Intervene

the conclusion that the Los Angeles District had violated the Constitution through intentional segregation. It further concluded that Proposition 1 was constitutional under the 14th Amendment and that plaintiffs were not entitled to a greater remedy than was provided by the federal Constitution. Crawford II, supra.

The Crawford Plaintiffs unsuccessfully petitioned the California Supreme Court for review, and then petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to reverse Crawford II.

Carlin Plaintiffs' co-counsel thereby were making a strong effort to continue judicial authority to mandatorily bus students for racial balance without having to show their school board had caused the “segregation” to be so alleviated.
 

Groundswell Parents, as Intervenors, Prepare for Trial

Concurrently, there was no lessening of the effort by the local ACLU counsel to impose busing in San Diego by the Carlin Plaintiffs, who had appealed the lack of a busing segment in the present order.

In the preparation of this representation, Enstrom's objections to forced busing in his 1977 commentary were transformed into the manner in which they would be posed at the intervention trial. The pleadings, and then the evidence, would reflect that the opposition was founded upon a truism stated in 1620 when the colonists were first forming their first legislative assemblies:

Every man (and woman) will more willingly obey laws to which he (or she) hath yielded his (or her) consent.

It would be shown that persons facing judicial affirmative action affecting them without going through the democratic process left them with no recourse but to assert their objections in the court proceeding in which it was being imposed.

The history of desegregation litigation reflects the extension of Brown v. Board of Education in 1954 from discontinuing segregation in public schools; to Green v. County School Board, requiring affirmative “desegregation” in rural schools; and then to Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, applying such affirmative action in
 

Brown I 

Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
Topeka, Kansas
 

Carlin v. Board of Education, San Diego Unified School District,
San Diego Superior Court No. 303800 (1967-1998)
San Diego, California
 

Green 

Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968)
New Kent County, Virginia
 

Swann 

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 32 (1971)
Charlotte, North Carolina
 

Crawford II 

Crawford v. Board of Education, 113 Cal.App.3d 633 (1980)
Los Angeles, California
 

— Handbook: Challenge One, pages 23 - 31 —