intervention papers, (2) at the trial upon the complaint in intervention, and (3) in opposition to an attack by the plaintiff-class in the appellate court (ultimately abandoned) upon the trial court's failure to include a busing segment in the integration plan.

Chapter Seven, Invoke Our Color-Blind Constitution to End Busing, is inspired by Justice Harlan's interpretation of the Constitution which the author contends is now applicable under changed circumstances in those schools whose students are still being judicially assigned on the basis of race after a generation of busing. But to get the courts to apply that interpretation, the San Diego approach is offered whereby adversely affected students and parents would individually invoke the Constitution to assert that their rights to color-blind school assignments may not be overridden for the benefit of any class of plaintiffs not suffering segregation in the sense of the Brown decision.

The chapter shows how this could by done by lawyers willing to represent such students and parents in pro bono publico in seeking, by intervention, the termination of court jurisdiction over school districts incrementally, starting in the area of student assignment, under the Dowell and Freeman decisions.

The intervening students can contend that their being mandatorily assigned on a racial basis to particular schools (1) subjects them to discrimination on the ground of race, in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act; and (2) infringes upon their liberty and privacy in violation of the Constitution.

The intervening citizen-taxpayer-parents can contend that the above-described assignments of their student-children by the federal judiciary (1) infringe upon parental liberty and (2) deny them the right to the participation in the state educational process to which they are entitled, as citizens, under the principle of federalism, in violation of the Constitution.

The author concludes that in addition to its "reverse" discriminatory impact upon the dissenters, of many races, whose opposition is not to integration but to busing decrees, such decrees have been detrimental to education in the affected school districts for many reasons, including the following:

1. Their disruptive effect;

2. Their horrendous litigative costs, making unavailable funds which could be better used in furtherance of the