Busing —Not Integration— Opposed: Invoke Our Color-Blind Constitution to End It |
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Conclusion | ||||||||||||||||||||
11.6 percent Black, 9.8 percent Hispanic, 1.4 percent Asian, and 1.2 percent other; in 1991 it was 37.1 percent White, 16.1 percent Black, 27.4 percent Hispanic, 10.2 percent Asian (including 7.9 percent Indochinese), and 9.2 percent other (including 7.9 percent Filipino). In 1967, in the Boston public schools the enrollment was 72 percent White, 26 percent Black and 2 percent other; in 1992, it was 20 percent White, 48 percent Black, 23 percent Hispanic, 9 percent Asian and .4 percent American Indian in rounded percentages. There also generally has been increasing racial diversity among members on school boards in those cities under busing orders since Swann, who are cognizant of the rights of those classified as minorities. Their actions, as in Norfolk, Oklahoma City, and DeKalb County, say that "minority" rights continue to be well served by neighborhood plans accompanied by integration programs such as free transfers. They say that the relinquishment of court jurisdiction, making such color-blind assignments possible, will mean more funds for education because of less money being spent for litigation. They say that students of all races should be free from treatment as "elements" as part of an effort to achieve "quantity" integration based on numerical ratios of races; but rather should be treated as "persons" in progressing toward "quality" integration by voluntary non-discriminatory means. There also is a new generation of parents and students, as may be seen in the continuous and widespread efforts to advance neighborhood school plans, who feel that now is the time to get beyond race in school assignments. And many of those, as set forth in the foregoing chapters, feel that their constitutional rights are being violated by the continuance of court-ordered busing. They can and must, as so many before them have done, invoke the Constitution to be assured of the relief to which they are entitled. They can invoke it on the basis of previous high court interpretations of its various provisions as set forth in the foregoing chapters and upon recent decision such as Missouri v. Jenkins 115 S. Ct. 2033 (1995). Finally, they can seek an interpretation that the Constitution does not tolerate the classification of the students of the many different races on the basis of their race or color for the purpose of mandatorily assigning them to particular schools for racial balance.
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Swann |
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 32 (1971) Charlotte, North Carolina |
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Dowell |
Dowell v. Bd. of Educ. of Okl. City Public Schools, (10th Cir. 1989), 890 F.2d 1483 Oklahoma City, Oklahoma |
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Freeman | Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S.Ct. 1430 (1992) DeKalb County School System (DCSS), DeKalb County, Georgia |
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Jenkins | Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 115 S. Ct. 2033 (1995) Kansas City, Missouri |
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Referenced Rights Cases by Title | ||||||||||||||||||||
Referenced Rights Cases by Date | ||||||||||||||||||||
Referenced U.S. Supreme Court Justices | ||||||||||||||||||||
— Busing: Conclusion, pages 131 - 134 — | ||||||||||||||||||||
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