Busing —Not Integration— Opposed: Invoke Our Color-Blind Constitution to End It / Chapter Seven |
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Invoke Our Color-Blind Constitution to End Busing |
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and Swann authorized the trial courts to take in those cases. With this transformation in the situation, continuing judicially-ordered busing in the City district would amount to an "integrative", rather then "desegregative", endeavor. Such an endeavor, to the extent that the governing authorities can continue to use racial classifications to accomplish its purpose, must rest upon a legal basis. In considering whether there is a legal basis to support this endeavor, it must be remembered that these are objections to continued busing being raised individually for the first time by those subject thereto. The intervenors thus pose issues different from those posed by the school boards in opposing busing in Green and Monroe in 1968 and Swann in 1971. The due process issue is entitled to be considered in a manner similar to the way the high court dealt with the facts concerning the Bolling students. Those students gained relief from racial school assignments under the Due Process Clause of the 5th Amendment invoked by the Supreme Court itself against D.C. school authorities. There, the federal school district failed to pass the test restated by Justice Powell in Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291: "Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination." The strict scrutiny test invoked as to those Bolling students must now be met by reason of the due process claim of these intervening students, as distinguished from the issue presented to the trial court as to the offending school district over twenty years ago. Under this test, the adversaries of the dissenting City School District students have the burden of showing, under present circumstances, the continuing necessity of the challenged racial classifications in the area of student assignment. A showing merely of "lingering effects" of a constitutional violation by the school board over twenty years ago would not, as a matter of law, pass that test. The Court should hold that the assignment of dissenting students to particular schools on a racial basis by the City School District arbitrarily discriminates against them and denies them due process of law. Finally, the Constitution is couched in "color-blind" language, under which the intervening students have been able to invoke its provisions without regard to their race or color. Under the same language, they claim to now be free from school assignments on the basis of their race or color; and this claim should not be subject to a contention that the remnants of a constitutional violation a generation ago by the school |
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Bolling |
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) [consolidated into Brown II] Washington, D.C. |
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Green |
Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968) New Kent County, Virginia |
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Monroe |
Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs of City of Jackson, Tenn., 391 U.S. 450, 459 (1968) Jackson, Tennessee |
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Swann |
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 32 (1971) Charlotte, North Carolina |
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Bakke | University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) | |||||||||||||||||||
— Busing: Chapter 7, pages 100 - 130 — | ||||||||||||||||||||
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