Busing —Not Integration— Opposed: Invoke Our Color-Blind Constitution to End It / Chapter Seven |
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Invoke Our Color-Blind Constitution to End Busing |
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Since the dissenting students are being judicially assigned beyond their neighborhood schools solely on the basis of their race to other schools to achieve a racial result, they suffer an impairment of liberty similar to that of Miss Brown in Brown I and the other complaining students in Bolling. Bolling held that legislatively mandating racial assignments to achieve racial separation of the nature sought by the District of Columbia was not a proper governmental objective. The high court proscribed the D.C. school district in Bolling from making such assignments. Brown II ruled that the district courts were to supervise the school districts in those cases in their "transition to a system of public education freed of racial discrimination." 349 U.S. at 299.
As Justice Powell said in his concurrence in Keyes, 413 U.S. at 220, Brown I was initially construed as negative in nature, calling only for state neutrality. He explains that the doctrine of Brown I, as amplified by Brown II, did not retain its original meaning: In a series of decisions extending from 1954 to 1971 the concept of state neutrality was transformed into the present constitutional doctrine requiring affirmative state action to desegregate school systems. The keystone case was Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 437-438... where school boards were declared to have "the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch." [underscoring added] Thus, Justice Powell concluded, the affirmative-duty concept articulated in a rural setting in Green flowered in Swann, into a new constitutional principle of general application to large urban areas as well. Intervenors underscore "desegregate" in the above explanation by Justice Powell as a key word in Green and in Swann. For the two school districts affected by those two decisions had a current history of "segregation" accomplished by racial discrimination. The Webster definitions of "segregation" and "integration" in connection with a recent study commissioned by the National School Boards Association were discussed by William Raspberry, in an article |
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Brown I |
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) Topeka, Kansas |
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Bolling |
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) [consolidated into Brown II] Washington, D.C. |
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Brown II |
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) Topeka, Kansas |
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Green |
Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968) New Kent County, Virginia |
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Swann |
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 32 (1971) Charlotte, North Carolina |
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Keyes |
Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1972) Denver, Colorado |
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— Busing: Chapter 7, pages 100 - 130 — | ||||||||||||||||||||
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