Busing —Not Integration— Opposed:
Invoke Our Color-Blind Constitution to End It  /  Chapter Seven

  
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Invoke Our Color-Blind Constitution
to End Busing
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Paramount, of course, are the interests of those movants whose children attend those schools and the interests of the student movants. Only the students being subjected to mandatory assignment to particular schools because of their race have the ability to fully protect their interest against being so discriminated against. And only the parents whose children are being subjected to such discrimination have the ability to fully protect their interest in stopping it. Compare Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925). Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).

Since such mandatory assignments of pupils are contemplated, as a part of the present court-ordered and board-approved "desegregation" plan, to continue for the indefinite future, movants are entitled to an opportunity to be heard as to the plan in the area of school assignments. See Dowell (1991) and Freeman (1992) cited above. Compare Bustop v. Superior Court, 69 C.A.3d 66 (1977).

A trial court's refusal to permit intervention by parents' organization in the fashioning of an integration plan was held to be an abuse of discretion in Bustop, supra. The showing by these movants is even stronger than that of the intervenor in Bustop, in that, rather than a corporate entity, the movants here are individual parents and their children directly affected by the continuing mandatory assignments, on a racial basis, of movant students for the indefinite future. It was pointed out in the Bustop decision, 69 C.A.3d at 73, that it also was in the interest of fairness that the intervenor be permitted to intervene.

Intervention consistently has been allowed well into (as late as the time of appeal) desegregation cases in recognition of their unique impact upon others than the named parties. See Johnson v. San Francisco Unified School District, 500 F.2d 349, 352-354 (9th Cir. 1974). Compare Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 180-182 (1969).

The interests of movants include their rights concerning the operation of the public schools in the District they help to maintain as taxpayers, and the conduct of the board members they choose as electors to carry out such operation.

In anticipation of being granted intervention, Lawyer plans to offer evidence in support of the allegations of City District busing dissenters in their complaint as outlined above. He expects he will be successful in the admission of sufficient evidence from the official
 

Pierce Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925)
 
Smuck Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (1969)
 
Yoder Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
 
Johnson Johnson v. San Francisco Unified School District,
500 F. 2d 349 (9th Cir. 1974)
San Francisco, California
 
Bustop Bustop v. Superior Court, 69 C.A. 3d 66 (1977)
[related to Crawford]
Los Angeles, California
 
Dowell Dowell v. Bd. of Educ. of Okl. City Public Schools,
(10th Cir. 1989), 890 F.2d 1483
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
 
Freeman Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S.Ct. 1430 (1992)
DeKalb County School System (DCSS),
DeKalb County, Georgia
  
  Busing: Chapter 7, pages 100 - 130 — PreviousNext
  
Busing —Not Integration— Opposed
Invoke our Color-Blind Constitution to End It

A Reasoned Opposition to Race-Based
Affirmative Action in Public Schools
by Elmer Enstrom, Jr.
Contents
History of the 30-year Carlin affirmative action lawsuit:
a pro bono case history of applying Constitutional principles.
  
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