to the continued forced busing of movant students which are not available to the defendant school board even if it were to seek to install a neighborhood system. And, of course, intervention is the only recourse for movants where a board has taken a position adverse to them by refusal to act upon repeated requests of movants and many others for the option of movant students to attend their neighborhood schools. Without intervention, they face busing into the year 2000 and beyond.

The gist of the foregoing arguments was contained in the successful intervention in 1980 by the "Groundswell" parties long before the Supreme Court rendered Martin v. Wilks, 109 S.Ct. 2180, on June 12, 1989. Wilks held that white firefighters were not precluded from challenging the employment decisions of a city pursuant to a consent decree as violating their civil rights, stating (Id. at 2184):

... A judgment or decree among parties to a lawsuit resolves issues as among them, but it does not conclude the rights of strangers to those proceedings.

This statement was preceded by noting that the "rule (that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process) is part of our 'deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court.'" Ibid. It was followed by a quotation from Chase National Bank v. Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431, at 441, (1934) (109 S.Ct. at 2185):

The law does not impose upon any person absolutely entitled to a hearing the burden of voluntary intervention in a suit to which he is a stranger.... Unless duly summoned to appear in a legal proceeding, a person not a privy may rest assured that a judgment recovered therein will not affect his legal rights.