in San Diego. That pressure first came from the San Diego board's own staff on Oct. 21, by way of a proposed mandatory busing plan.

The foregoing actions offered a basis for renewing a motion to intervene. In Chapter Three, I discuss the matters taken into consideration in the preparation of the motion and the proposed complaint in intervention. The claims of intervenors, who were individual parents and their District student-children and an association composed of such persons, are set in Chapter Three. They invoked the California and United States Constitutions, Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and California taxpayers' statute (Cal. Code of Civ. Proc., Sec. 526a).

On Dec. 12, 1980, the motion to intervene, citing the Los Angeles case of Bustop as one of the supporting authorities, was granted. Like the school boards in Los Angeles and in San Francisco, in the Johnson case, the San Diego board joined the plaintiffs in opposing the intervention. These attempts to prevent busing dissenters from offering evidence individually illustrate the adverse nature of the boards' relationship to such dissenters in desegregation cases. If objecting boards were able to exclude busing dissenters from the trial in accordance with the initial rulings at the trial court level in the Bustop and Johnson cases, the dissenters would be unable even to introduce, let alone be considered and preserved for appeal, evidence such as the following which was offered at the Carlin trial.

3. Trial on Complaint in Intervention. The intervention on December 15, 1980, of the Groundswell dissenters gave them standing to see that the dissenting students, and those similarly situated, were treated as "persons" instead of "elements" in the proceedings. On March 3, 1981, they presented to the school board petitions signed by some 5,983 persons (of whom 1,856 were students and the others either (1) taxpayer-parents, or (2) taxpayer-voters in the District) objecting to student assignments, because of their race, away from their neighborhood public school location as a violation of their respective rights. See details in Chapter Three.

Without intervention, this and other objections presented to the board would ordinarily have been buried in its files as the type of evidence a board had no standing to present to a court under the Monroe ruling described in Chapter Three. With the standing of the individual