should consider whether school district has complied in good faith with desegregation decree since it was entered and whether vestiges of past discrimination have been eliminated to the extent practicable.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed and the case remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. Justice Marshall dissented, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, and Justice Souter did not participate.

Excerpts from Arguments
and Summary of Decision
in DeKalb County, Ga., case

Excerpts from the Arguments Before The Court on Oct. 15, 1991, as reported in The United States Law Week, follow the report's statement of the ruling being appealed (60 LW 3279 at 3280-81):

The Eleventh Circuit ruled that DCSS will not achieve unitary status "until it maintains at least three years of racial equality in [the six Green] categories: student assignment, faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities." Furthermore, the court said, "DCSS must consider pairing and clustering of schools, drastic gerrymandering of school zones, and grade reorganization." After 20 years of court supervision, the Eleventh Circuit concluded, "DCSS continues to operate racially identifiable schools. The DCSS has never achieved unitary status and it retains the duty to eliminate all vestiges of the dual school system."

... Rex E. Lee, of Provo, Utah, argued before the Supreme Court on behalf of DCSS. According to Lee, DeKalb County grew rapidly after the issuance of the 1969 order to desegregate. Since that time, he said, the percentage of black students in the school population increased from 5 to 50 percent. And, he continued, the district court concluded that it was the shift in population that caused the resegregation, not any action taken by DCSS.