relief they sought as to avoiding the busing of students provided they made a satisfactory showing to the lower courts of compliance with the Swann Doctrine of unitariness, as amplified in the majority opinions, in their systems. The outcome as to busing in those cases thus appeared to be without consideration as to the impact of continued busing upon voiceless, innocent busing dissenters.

This lack of reference to third parties not joined but adversely affected by the continuance or institution of busing, however, was a natural outcome of the Court's limitation of its decisions to the issues on the records presented by the parties.

Then, too, lacking the sophistication and prestige of those filing amici briefs in the above Mendez and Jackson cases, it would have been extremely optimistic to have expected that the Groundswell amici briefs would similarly inspire mention of their existence or, of course, of any of the points they presented.

Nonetheless, encouragement may be derived from the interest expressed by the Court members during the course of argument, about such matters as the definition of "segregation" and the length of time it would take to end busing under the interpretation of doctrine urged by busing proponents. And a concurring opinion by Justice Scalia suggests that too great a burden is presently being placed on school boards seeking to implement neighborhood school plans.
 

Turning first to excerpts in The United States Law Week from the Arguments Before the Court on Oct. 9, 1990, in the Oklahoma City case, following restatement by the Solicitor General of the issue presented, as reported at 59 LW 3263, at 3264:

Solicitor General Kenneth W. Starr argued on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae. He said it is clear that federal courts are duty bound to employ their broad remedial powers to vindicate the rights of school children. In issuing hundreds of school desegregation decrees, he continued, courts have proceeded on the assumption that federal judicial power terminates when a