Busing —Not Integration— Opposed: Invoke Our Color-Blind Constitution to End It / Chapter Four |
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Befriending Busing Dissenters in the Supreme Court |
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Amici's first point, summarized in Appendix VI, in essence urges the high court to note the existence of such students, not as "elements" in such a plan, but rather as "persons" who have adverse feelings capable of affecting their hearts and minds, entitled to be considered, in a manner similar to those of the students specifically referred to in Brown, to racially-based assignments. The second point made by San Diego amici, as noted in the summary of argument (Appendix VI), is that court-ordered racial assignments of the Oklahoma City students away from their neighborhood schools impairs the assigned students' liberty and privacy in violation of the Due Process Clause. I also argued this point, along with the separation of powers point, in the Brief of Intervenors in Carlin v. Board of Education, San Diego Unified School District, as Amici Curiae, in Support of Petitioners Freeman, et al., v. Pitts, et al., Respondents, infra. A year later, I prepared the San Diego amici brief in the Freeman (DeKalb County, Ga.) case in a similar fashion to that filed in the Oklahoma City case, and mailed it to the Supreme Court Clerk on May 1, 1991. The Summary of Argument in the Freeman brief of the Groundswell Amici, annexed as Appendix VII, concludes: The order to racially bus students, is therefore, of a legislative nature beyond the (Circuit) panel's authority. It also fails to provide for hearing the objections of students upon whom it now focuses. Thus, it is in violation of the separation of powers and the due process provisions of the United States Constitution. By filing these amici briefs, the San Diego busing dissenters invited consideration of the issues of racial discrimination, due process and separation of powers, in the proceedings concerning busing in Oklahoma City and DeKalb County, in behalf of, and in recognition of, fellow dissenters there. The Oklahoma City case was argued before the Supreme Court on October 2, 1990, and decided on January 15, 1991; following which the DeKalb County case was argued on October 7, 1991, and decided on March 31, 1992. In both decisions, the school boards were allowed to gain the |
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Brown I | Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) Topeka, Kansas |
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Carlin | Carlin v. Board of Education, San Diego Unified School District, San Diego Superior Court, No. 303800 (1967-1998) San Diego, California |
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Dowell | Dowell v. Bd. of Educ. of Okl. City Public Schools, (10th Cir. 1989), 890 F.2d 1483 Oklahoma City, Oklahoma |
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Freeman | Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S.Ct. 1430 (1992) DeKalb County, Georgia |
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— Busing: Chapter 4, pages 51 - 66 — | ||||||||||||||||||||
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